Katsikopoulos,K.V.
Gigerenzer,G.

Abstract People violate expected utility theory and this has been traditionally modeled by augmenting its weight-and-add framework\nby nonlinear transformations of values and probabilities. Yet individuals often use one-reason decision-making when making\ncourt decisions or choosing cellular phones, and institutions do the same when creating rules for traffic safety or fair play\nin sports. We analyze a model of one-reason decision-making, the priority heuristic, and show that it simultaneously implies\ncommon consequence effects, common ratio effects, reflection effects, and the fourfold pattern of risk attitude. The preferences\nrepresented by the priority heuristic satisfy some standard axioms. This work may provide the basis for a new look at bounded\nrationality.

Katsikopoulos, K. V., & Gigerenzer, G. (2008). One-reason decision-making: Modeling violations of expected utility theory. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 37, 35-56.(Reprinted in Heuristics: The foundations of adaptive behavior, pp. 186-200, by G. Gigerenzer, R. Hertwig, & T. Pachur, Eds., 2011, New York: Oxford University Press) (Full text)

Publication year	2008
Document type:	Article
Publication status:	Published
External URL:	http://library.mpib-berlin.mpg.de/ft/kk/KK_One_2008.pdf View
Categories:	Priority heuristicProbabilitySportsBounded RationalityMemoryExpected Utility
Keywords:	decision makingeutevtst. petersburg paradox