Overcoming difficulties in Bayesian reasoning: A reply to Lewis and Keren (1999) and Mellers and McGraw (1999) (1999)
Authors
Abstract
Bayesian reasoning can be improved by representing information in\nfrequency formats rather than in probabilities. This thesis opens\nup applications in medicine, law, statistics education, and other\nfields. The beneficial effect is no longer in dispute, but rather\nits cause and its boundary conditions. C. Lewis and G. Keren (1999)\nargued that the effect of frequency formats is due to "joint statements"\nrather than to "frequency statements." However, they overlooked the\nfact that our thesis is about frequency formats, not just any kind\nof frequency statements. We show that joint statements alone cannot\naccount for the effect. B. A. Mellers and A. P. McGraw (1999) proposed\na boundary condition under which the beneficial effect is reduced.\nIn a reanalysis of our original data, we found this reduction for\nthe problem they used but not for any other problem. We conclude\nby summarizing results indicating that teaching frequency representations\nfosters insight into Bayesian reasoning. (PsycINFO Database Record\n(c) 2008 APA, all rights reserved) (journal abstract)
Bibliographic entry
Gigerenzer, G., & Hoffrage, U. (1999). Overcoming difficulties in Bayesian reasoning: A reply to Lewis and Keren (1999) and Mellers and McGraw (1999). Psychological Review, 106, 425-430. (Full text)