Gigerenzer,G.

In this article, I deal with the study of human errors in experimental psychology. The problem that researchers try to resolve is this: How can one infer the laws of cognition- of perception, memory, and thought? One answer is to study the systematic errors people make. At first glance, this program looks like a straightforward extension of Francis Bacon's plan for studying nature's errors, or of Freud's strategy to analyze repressed memories, slips of tongue, and abnormal neurotic behavior. The idea is to catch nature when it does not pay attention - creating strange facts such as blood rain in Bavaria and an Irish girl with several horns growing on her body (Daston and Park, 1998). However, there is an important difference. We can easily see what is wrong with a goat with two heads or a man with obsessive-compulsive hand washing, and understand that it is not to the benefit of the animal or the human. Cognitive errors, however, are not as clear, as we will soon see. Here, one has to define rather than simply observe what an error of judgment is. In this article, I argue: 1. The study of cognitive errors has been dominated by a logical definition of errors. But this narrow norm tends to mistake forms of human intelligence that go beyond logic for stupid blunders, and consequently fails to unravel the laws of mind. 2. An ecological analysis, in place of a logical one, instead reveals the existence of good errors, which open a window into the mind. The prototype of an ecological analysis is the study of visual illusions.

Gigerenzer, G. (2005). I think, therefore I err. Social Research, 72, 195-218.(Reprinted in Psychologica, 2006, 93-110) (Full text)

Publication year	2005
Document type:	Article
Publication status:	Published
External URL:	http://library.mpib-berlin.mpg.de/ft/GG/GG_I_think_2005.pdf View
Categories:	Animal BehaviorCognitive IllusionsMemory
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