Gigerenzer,G.
Sturm,T.

(From the chapter) In this chapter, we argue that, in part, the generation of new theories can be understood by a tools-to-theories heuristic. This proposed heuristic (not logic) of theory development makes use of various tools of justification that have been used by scientific communities. By tools we mean both analytical and physical instruments that are used to evaluate given theories. Analytical tools can be either empirical or nonempirical. Examples of analytical methods of the empirical kind are tools for data processing, such as statistics; examples of the nonempirical kind are normative criteria for the evaluation of hypotheses, such as logical consistency. Examples of physical tools are measurement instruments, such as clocks. The main goal of this chapter is to show that some tools can provide metaphors that become concepts for psychological theories. We will discuss the heuristic role, as well as the possibilities and problems, of two tools developed during, as it has been called retrospectively, the cognitive revolution in the American psychology of the 1960s: inferential statistics and the digital computer. The cognitive revolution was more than an overthrow of behaviorism by mental concepts. Mental concepts have been continuously part of scientific psychology, even coexisting with American behaviorism during its heyday (Lovie, 1983). The cognitive revolution did more than revive the mental; it changed its meaning. The two new classes of theories that emerged, and partially overlapped, pictured the mind as an "intuitive statistician" or a "computer program." This chapter is structured as follows. First, we outline how tools inspire new theories, both on an individual level and on the level of a scientific community (Section I). Second, we sketch the possible value for the present explanatory approach for a critical evaluation of theories (Section II). After this, we analyze in greater detail the two examples of inferential statistics (Section III) and the digital computer (Section IV). We close with a reconsideration of the issue of the generation of psychological theories (Section V). In doing so, we aim to show how ongoing psychological research sometimes can, and should, integrate considerations concerning its history and philosophy, rather than outsourcing them to other disciplines. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2008 APA, all rights reserved)

Gigerenzer, G., & Sturm, T. (2007). Tools = theories = data? On some circular dynamics in cognitive science. In M. G. Ash & T. Sturm (Eds.), Psychology's territories: Historical and contemporary perspectives form different disciplines (pp. 305-342). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. (Full text)

Publication year	2007
Document type:	In book
Publication status:	Published
External URL:	http://library.mpib-berlin.mpg.de/ft/gg/GG_Tools_2007.pdf View
Categories:
Keywords:	behaviorismcognitive processesconceptsdigital computersheuristicshistory of psychologyhumaninferencepsychological theoriesstatisticsuscognitive revolutiondigital computerhistoryinferential statisticsmental conceptspsychology