Rebitschek,F.G.
Krems,J.F.
Jahn,G.

© 2016, Psychonomic Society, Inc.Diagnostic reasoning draws on knowledge about effects and their potential causes. The causal-diversity effect in diagnostic reasoning normatively depends on the distribution of effects in causal structures, and thus, a psychological diversity effect could indicate whether causally structured knowledge is used in evaluating the probability of a diagnosis, if the effect were to covary with manipulations of causal structures. In four experiments, participants dealt with a quasi-medical scenario presenting symptom sets (effects) that consistently suggested a specified diagnosis (cause). The probability that the diagnosis was correct had to be rated for two opposed symptom sets that differed with regard to the symptoms’ positions (proximal or diverse) in the causal structure that was initially acquired. The causal structure linking the diagnosis to the symptoms and the base rate of the diagnosis were manipulated to explore whether the diagnosis was rated as more probable for diverse than for proximal symptoms when alternative causations were more plausible (e.g., because of a lower base rate of the diagnosis in question). The results replicated the causal diversity effect in diagnostic reasoning across these conditions, but no consistent effects of structure and base rate variations were observed. Diversity effects computed in causal Bayesian networks are presented, illustrating the consequences of the structure manipulations and corroborating that a diversity effect across the different experimental manipulations is normatively justified. The observed diversity effects presumably resulted from shortcut reasoning about the possibilities of alternative causation.

Rebitschek, F. G., Krems, J. F., & Jahn, G. (2016). The diversity effect in diagnostic reasoning. Memory & Cognition, 44, 789-805. doi:10.3758/s13421-016-0592-0 (Full text)

Publication year	2016
Document type:	Article
Publication status:	Published
External URL:	http://dx.doi.org/10.3758/s13421-016-0592-0 View
Categories:
Keywords:	alternative causation heuristiccausal diversity effectdiagnostic reasoningsuppression effect