¿Herramientas=teorías=datos? Sobre cierta dinámica circular en la ciencia cognitiva [Tools=Theories=Data? On some circular dynamics in cognitive science] (2011)
Authors
Abstract
Some instruments have played such a strong role in psychological research that they have become metaphors for the subject matter of such research itself, or that they have lead to the generation of new psychological concepts and theories. This chapter provides two related case studies for this claim. Since the so-called “cognitive revolution” of the 1960s, the human mind has been theoretically described as an “intuitive statistician” or as a computer program. Such theories have been strongly inspired by the tools introduced into psychological research somewhat before the spreading of such theories within the psychological community: inferential statistics and the digital computer. We discuss both the pros and cons of the metaphors. Metaphors can be advantageous, as they can open up new research areas, questions, and data; but metaphors can also include losses, because they always emphasize some aspects and leave others out. Moreover, instead of the theories being evaluated by data gathered by means of seemingly neutral research tools, there is a bias towards theories which match with the functioning or uses of specific research tools, a bias which is sometimes reinforced by data which can only be produced by the new tools. Scientists should be aware of such a dynamics in order to avoid circularities in their theorizing.
Bibliographic entry
Gigerenzer, G., & Sturm, T. (2011). ¿Herramientas=teorías=datos? Sobre cierta dinámica circular en la ciencia cognitiva [Tools=Theories=Data? On some circular dynamics in cognitive science]. Quaderns de Psicologia, 13, 35-61. (Full text)
Miscellaneous
| Publication year | 2011 | |
|---|---|---|
| Document type: | Article | |
| Publication status: | Published | |
| External URL: | http://library.mpib-berlin.mpg.de/ft/gg/GG_Herramientas_2011.pdf View | |
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