Pachur,T.
Todd,P.M.
Gigerenzer,G.
Schooler,L.J.
Goldstein,D.G.

(from the chapter) Our goal in this chapter is to give an overview of empirical research on the recognition heuristic since Goldstein and Gigerenzer (1999, 2002) first specified it (see also Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 2011; Pachur, Todd, Gigerenzer, Schooler, & Goldstein, 2011). We start by describing and clarifying the basic characteristics and assumptions of the heuristic. For this purpose, we trace how the notion of the heuristic developed, and we locate recognition knowledge in relation to other knowledge about previous encounters with an object, such as the context of previous encounters, their frequency, and their ease of retrieval from memory-that is, their fluency. Next, we provide an overview of empirical evidence supporting answers to two important questions: In what environments is the recognition heuristic ecologically rational? And do people rely on the recognition heuristic in these environments? We then review evidence for a bold prediction of the recognition heuristic, namely, that when recognition knowledge discriminates between two objects, further cues are ignored and only recognition is used to make the decision. We close with a discussion of findings that appear problematic for the mechanism, as well as possible ways it can be extended, and relations to other judgment phenomena influenced by a previous encounter with an object. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)

Pachur, T., Todd, P. M., Gigerenzer, G., Schooler, L. J., & Goldstein, D. G. (2012). When is the recognition heuristic an adaptive tool? In P. M. Todd, G. Gigerenzer, & the ABC Research Group, Ecological rationality: Intelligence in the world (pp. 113-143). New York: Oxford University Press.

Publication year	2012
Document type:	In book
Publication status:	Published
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Keywords:	*decision making*heuristics*rationality*recognition (learning)