Mousavi,S.
Gigerenzer,G.

(from the chapter) A few decades ago, cognitive scientists studied judgment errors to discover rules that govern our minds, just as visual errors were studied to unravel the laws of perception. This practice has generated a long list of so-called cognitive biases, with disappointingly little insight into how the human mind works. In this chapter, we present our diagnosis of this fruitless labor. Human judgments are usually considered erroneous when measured against logical and statistical norms of rationality. Hence, we address two essential questions of cognitive studies: What is rational judgment? How can one construct reasonable cognitive norms? To answer these questions, we scrutinize two phenomena famous for supposedly demonstrating human logical and calculative errors: the Wason selection task and over-confidence. First, we show that the Wason selection task confuses logic with rationality, specifically social rationality. Second, we distinguish five types of overconfidence and the environmental structures in which they appear. These two steps bring to light our view of rational judgment and proper norms: Rational judgment must be evaluated against an ecological notion of rationality, which in turn requires constructing content-sensitive norms. In contrast to logical norms, which are content blind in assuming the truth of syntax, content-sensitive norms reflect the actual goals and specifics of the situation. Ecological rationality is about the match of decision-making strategies to the structure of information in the environment. This match is an ecological one but not a mirror image of the environment. Finally, while the literature on cognition claims that "debiasing" is hardly possible, we illustrate the contrary. Finally, humans react to different representations of information differently. Thus, the way in which information is presented to decision makers can enhance or hinder sound judgment. Using examples from the medical field, in which patients and doctors have to make vital decisions under pressures of time, emotions, and money, we demonstrate how communication of information can be enhanced through transparent modes of presenting risk information. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)

Mousavi, S., & Gigerenzer, G. (2011). Revisiting the "error" in studies of cognitive errors. In D. A. Hofmann & M. Frese (Eds.), Errors in organizations (pp. 97-112). New York: Taylor & Francis. (Full text)

Publication year	2011
Document type:	In book
Publication status:	Published
External URL:	http://library.mpib-berlin.mpg.de/ft/smo/SMO_Revisiting_2011.pdf View
Categories:
Keywords:	*cognition*decision making*errors*judgment*risk perceptioncognitive biaslogical thinkingmedical patientsphysiciansrationalitytherapeutic processes