Better but still biased: Analytic cognitive style and belief bias (2015)
Authors
Abstract
Belief bias is the tendency for prior beliefs to influence people's deductive reasoning in two ways: through the application of a simple belief-heuristic (response bias) and through the application of more effortful reasoning for unbelievable conclusions (accuracy effect or motivated reasoning). Previous research indicates that cognitive ability is the primary determinant of the effect of beliefs on accuracy. In the current study, we show that the mere tendency to engage analytic reasoning (analytic cognitive style) is responsible for the effect of cognitive ability on motivated reasoning. The implications of this finding for our understanding of the impact of individual differences on belief bias are discussed.
Bibliographic entry
Trippas, D., Pennycook, G., Verde, M. F., & Handley, S. J. (2015). Better but still biased: Analytic cognitive style and belief bias. Thinking and Reasoning, 21, 431-445. doi:10.1080/13546783.2015.1016450 (Full text)
Miscellaneous
| Publication year | 2015 | |
|---|---|---|
| Document type: | Article | |
| Publication status: | Published | |
| External URL: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13546783.2015.1016450 View | |
| Categories: | ||
| Keywords: | belief biasbelief biascognitive abilityindividual differencesmotivated reasoningmotivated reasoningresponse biasresponse biassignal detection theorysignal detection theorystyle |