Optimal doubling strategy against a suboptimal opponent (2005)
Authors
Abstract
For two-person zero-sum games, where the probability of each player winning is a continuous function of time and is known to both players, the mutually optimal strategy for proposing and accepting a doubling of the game value is known. We present an algorithm for deriving the optimal doubling strategy of a player who is aware of the suboptimal strategy followed by the opponent. We also present numerical results about the magnitude of the benefits; the results support the claim that repeated application of the algorithm by both players leads to the mutually optimal strategy.
Bibliographic entry
Katsikopoulos, K. V., & Simsek, Ö. (2005). Optimal doubling strategy against a suboptimal opponent. Journal of Applied Probability, 42, 867-872.
Miscellaneous
| Publication year | 2005 | |
|---|---|---|
| Document type: | Article | |
| Publication status: | Published | |
| External URL: | ||
| Categories: | ||
| Keywords: | doublinggamblingoptimal strategy |